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Abstract 
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 I present a case for a rapprochement between aspects of rationalism and scientific realism, by way 
of a general framework employing modal epistemology and elements of 2-dimensional semantics (2DS).  
My overall argument strategy is meta-inductive: The bulk of this paper establishes a “base case,” i.e., a 
concretely constructive example by which I demonstrate this linkage. The base case or constructive 
example acts as the exemplar for generating, in a constructively ‘bottom-up’ fashion, a more generally 
rigorous case for rationalism-realism qua modal epistemology.  The exemple I choose in D. Chalmers’ 
(2002) modal rationalism and R. Giere’s (1985, 1988) constructive realism.  I show by way of a thorough 
analysis how Giere’s claims concerning modal scope are characterized as instances of Chalmers’ modal 
rationalism, both weak and strong.  In essence, as I demonstrate via Chalmers’ notions, ceteris paribus 
the constructive realist ultimately opts for a comparatively wider gate, characterized by modal reasoning, 
to lead from the rooms of conceivability qua thought experiments and models, to the pastures of 
metaphysical possibility.  Chalmers likewise tries to erect such a wider gate, in his general conceivability-
possibility theses.  Anti-realists, on the other hand, see a narrower passage and my contention herein is 
that they suffer from modal myopia, which hopefully the ‘corrective vision’ of Chalmers’ modal 
rationalism can restore. In the introduction and concluding sections I sketch out suggestions of 
constructing ‘inductive steps’ from my base case, to generate more extensively general claims regarding 
realism qua rationalism.  
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1. Introduction 
 The connection between rationalism and scientific realism has been given some 
consideration, albeit in broadly “externalist” (i.e., historical and value-theoretic) fashions by 
Boyd (1985), McMullin (1993), Psillos (1996), and Smart (1963).i  I argue here that a more 
rigorous treatment of the subject can be undertaken, which highlights aspects regarding certain 
methodological issues centering on particular epistemological and metaphysical notions 
characteristic of the central role that models play in theory-formation.  Such notions are usually 
relegated as topics of interest “internal” to the philosophy of science, insofar as particularly 
unique features of the domain of study (science) are abstracted away from other broadly 
characterized cultural or contextual issues which permeate the field.ii  In particular, the analysis I 
present essentially employs the tools of Chalmers’ (2002) “modal rationalism,” applied to the 
target domain of Giere’s (1985, 1988) “constructive realism.”iii 
 As I discuss in greater detail below, although Chalmers’ project is usually associated with 
his particular interpretative rendition of “2D semantics” (2DS)—e.g., as presented in Chalmers 
& Jackson (2001) as well as in a more inchoate form in (Chalmers, 1996) and certainly alluded 
to in (Chalmers, 2002)—there are good reasons not to focus excessively or exclusively on this 
apparatus per se, lest one lose sight of the modal forest from the semantic trees.  To put it another 
way, as I argue below, at best one could view the issue of 2DS in Chalmers (2002) as secondary, 
in the face of the more essential epistemological and metaphysical claims he makes therein.  Not 
only do the latter points provide an optimal framework in which one can subject Giere’s notions 
to closer scrutiny, but they may also go a long way to answer to some of Chalmers’ many critics 
(e.g., Bealer (2002) and Winstanley (2007), among others) who appear to take issue more with 
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his stronger claims pertaining to particular hermeneutical nuances dealing with 2DS per se.  Such 
issues, as I claim and argue below, do not seriously threaten (or for that matter may not even 
apply in a relevant manner) to some of the basic points I make here concerning constructive 
realism qua modal rationalism. 
 Subjecting scientific realism to a more systematic modal analysis has distinct 
philosophical advantages which I hope shall be made apparent in the ensuing discussion below.  
I chose Chalmers vis-à-vis Giere, due to the many conceptual linkages the latter may offer to the 
former, as a constructive example, or as a “base case” for a more generally meta-inductive 
argument strategy that I wish to present.iv  However, a few brief remarks can be made here 
regarding the “inductive step” of my argument strategy: I.e., figuratively speaking, the generally 
recursive features stemming from the base case that indicate what I consider to be the significant 
structural patterns regarding some of the significant epistemological and metaphysical features of 
scientific realism qua modal rationalism. 
 For starters, despite the many diverse emphases placed on methodology and 
epistemology by various arguments advancing the case for scientific realismv, au fond this 
position is primarily underwritten by a metaphysical claim and, secondarily, by a semantic one:  
(SR-1) The degree of explanatory coherence and predictive accuracy of any given theory T is in 
direct measure to its truth. 
The above platitude (SR-1) is one in which prima facie any scientific realist would assent to.vi 
Metaphysically, of course, as entailed by SR-1, the most prominent one played by a theory’s 
unobservables has to do with representing or corresponding to propositions and states of affairs 
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concerning some of the world’s essential features subject to scientific prediction and explanation. 
Unobservables are, in that regard, pace the difficulties associated with verisimilitude (mentioned 
in n. vi. below), are better thought of as being “fallible veracities” than “convenient fictions.” 
(Teller, 2004)  Hence, the primary metaphysical claim here made by the realist has to do with 
assessing a theory T’s capacity at characterizing the transcendentvii propositional structure of 
features of the world which (in principle) could fall under scientific scrutiny.viii  The secondary 
aspect of semantics concerns the specification of a T’s truth-conditions.  As I discuss below, 
intensional semantics likewise characterizes a notion of ‘meaning’ fundamentally in terms of 
representation (Nimtz, 2005).  Hence, the very meaning of unobservables hinges on their 
representational capacities. 
 The modal rationalism of Chalmers (2002) on the other hand can be viewed au fond as an 
epistemological endeavor—suggested (of course) by the very terms. Among other reasons, this is 
also signaled in Chalmers’ interpretation of 2DS, in which the “vertical dimension” of worlds 
depict epistemic possibilities such that the “diagonal” or primary intension “capture[s] epistemic 
dependence on meaning.” (Nimtz, 2005, 10, emphasis added). Moreover, “[i]t is this dependence 
of truth and reference on our ability to determine extensions in epistemically possible worlds that 
Chalmers captures by means of his framework.” (Nimtz, 2005, 9).  Hence, just as Chalmers’ very 
efforts essentially attempt to set up a concordance between epistemic conceivability and 
metaphysical possibility, so an effort for a similar rapprochement between scientific realism and 
modal rationalism attempts tout court metaphysical-epistemological concordance in the 
philosophy of science.  To be sure, just as Chalmers’ critics (e.g., Bealer (2002), Winstanley 
(2007), etc.) have accused him of overreach, the same could be said for the project here, should 
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not the appropriate qualifications and clarifications be subsequently brought to light, as I strive to 
achieve in the appropriate sections below. 
 On an even more broad and general level (i.e., the “for all n…” concluding claim in my 
meta-inductive strategy) however, one can argue (as e.g., Fara (2007) does concerning the topic 
of dispositions) that the issue of modality is obviously philosophically fundamental and 
ubiquitous.  Writes Fara (2007, 1): 
The topic of dispositions is interesting in its own right. But it derives further interest from 
the fact that appeals to dispositions have been made in just about every area of 
philosophical enquiry. There are explicitly dispositional analyses, for example, of mental 
states, of colors, of value, of properties…dispositions have been enlisted, in one form or 
another, in the service of illuminating phenomena ranging from our understanding of the 
logical constants to the nature of beauty. Philosophers interested in just about anything 
should be interested in dispositions. 
One could practically substitute salva veritate the term ‘modality’ for every instance of 
‘disposition(/s)’ and the above passage would read just as persuasively.  Whether one is working 
in semantics, epistemology, or metaphysics, in whatever philosophical domain or specialty, i.e., 
philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, etc., achieving some clarity concerning a rigorous 
analysis of realism qua modal rationalism shall prove itself to be directly beneficial: For all 
philosophical fields, to varying extent and degree, wrestle with questions concerning realism 
versus anti-realism concerning their essential analysanda. To characterize such wrestling in the 
‘court’ according to the protocols of modal rationalism, can only enhance, if nothing else, the 
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respective struggles with more systematically refined degrees and elements of “philosophical 
sportsmanship.”ix    
2. Constructive Realism-A Brief Overview 
As suggested (n. iii. below) “constructive” is ambiguous, as, Hacking (1982) for instance 
adopts the same terminology characteristic of his version of scientific realism, which diverges 
substantially from Giere’s (1985, 1988).  In particular, Hacking and Giere differ on what 
constitutes the essential ontology characteristic of the basic units of description of their 
respective projects: For Hacking, it is the experiment (and its associated protocols of construction 
and design), whereas for Giere, it is the model (with its respective design and interpretation 
protocols).x  
2.1 Constructive Realism’s Ancestor: Van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism  
However, despite their divergences, both Giere’s and Hacking’s positions can be viewed as 
realist rejoinders to B. Van Fraassen’s (1980) ‘constructive empiricism’: “To be an empiricist is 
to withhold belief in anything that goes beyond the actual, observable phenomena…involving a 
search for truth only about what is actual and observable.” (1980, 202-203, italics added)  
Moreover, a constructive empiricist regards the primary value of scientific theories as developing 
“imaginative pictures which have a hope of suggesting new statements about observable 
regularities and correcting old ones.” (Van Frassen (1980, 1998) 1081-1082) 
Van Fraassen’s first passage cited above indicates the constructive empiricist’s metaphysical 
and semantic rejoinder to (SR-1): Truth-conditions are restricted to the class of all observables of 
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a theory T.xi  Van Fraassen refers to this restriction of truth-conditions as a theory’s empirical 
adequacy: 
(CE-1) Science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory 
involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate…[W]hat it [T] says about the 
observable things and events in the world is true—exactly if it ‘saves the phenomena.’  
(Van Fraassen (1980, 1998) 1069). 
The subtly epistemic twist for the constructive empiricist involves this belief versus acceptance 
distinction alluded to above.  According to Van Fraassen, realism entails that: 
(SR-2) Science aims to give us, in its theories, [1] a literally true story of what the world is like; 
and [2] acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. (1066, italics 
added). 
The anti-realist hence is free to deny either the metaphysical-semantic claim [1] of (SR-2) or the 
epistemic claim [2].  The constructive empiricist denies the latterxii: 
(CE-2) [T]he literal construal of scientific language concerns our face-value interpretation of its 
meaning…By distinguishing…accepting a theory and believing it to be true, 
…constructive empiricis[m] recommends a position of agnosticism towards the 
theoretical [i.e., the unobservables]. (1233-1234) 
 Hence, given that (CE-1) & (CE-2) entail that that a scientific theory T makes literal 
truth-claims one may remain metaphysically agnostic towards (regarding T’s unobservables)—
i.e., accepting T’s literal story insofar as it retains its empirical adequacy or “saves the 
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phenomena” to its fullest extent—what characterizes this rendition of empiricism as specifically 
‘constructive’?  Aside from the role played by T’s “imaginative pictures” mentioned above, there 
resides also the essential role played by instrumentation and experimentation vis-à-vis theory 
construction. In particular, the former test the empirical adequacy and guide in the continued 
construction and completion of the latter, while (conversely) the latter formulate questions “in a 
systematic and compendious fashion” and guide the design of experiments conceived and 
implemented with the goal of answering such questions, among other things.xiii  In this regard, it 
is worth mentioning in passing that Hacking’s notion of “constructive” remains faithful to Van 
Fraassen’s, according to the letter.  Nevertheless, “[t]he [constructive realist] experimentalist 
does not believe in electrons because,…they ‘save the phenomena’.  On the contrary, we believe 
in electrons because we use them to create new phenomena.”  (Hacking (1982, 1998) 1164-
1165). In this manner, Hacking’s epistemic and methodological points echo Giere’s. “From the 
standpoint of [constructive realism] to understand a system is to know how it works.” (Giere 
(1985), 85)  I now turn to Giere’s points in greater detail below.   
2.2 Giere’s Constructive Realism  
Though Hacking, as I briefly mentioned above, employed the term “constructive” in a 
mode and manner seemingly faithful to Van Fraassen to the letter, it appears that R. Giere (1985, 
1988) may be far more attuned its spirit of interpretation: “In science, he [Van Fraassen] claims, 
it is the models, not the linguistic forms, that occupy center stage…[Moreover] the proper 
language for philosophical study of science is mathematics, not metamathematics.” (1985, 75-
76)  Nevertheless, Van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy should give one pause, since: 
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[W]e see van Fraassen constructing a model of science and attempting to show that the 
model [itself] is empirically adequate…Only occasionally [however]…does he argue the 
case at a level of scientific practice.  But it is at this level that empiricism stands or 
falls...[For example,] [i]t is very difficult, I think, to save the phenomena of molecular 
biology, as a scientific enterprise…[E.g.,] [m]uch time in Crick’s laboratory was spent 
[on]…representations of nucleic acids in their scale model [i.e., on T’s 
unobservables]…not striving merely to account for spots on X-ray photographs. [i.e., 
saving the phenomena]. (1985, 95-96, italics added) 
In other words, it appears somewhat ironic that given the Van Fraassen’s valiant efforts to bring 
philosophy of science down from the stratosphere of logically and meta-mathematically 
regimented “rational reconstructions” and plant its feet more firmly in workaday empirical soil, 
au fond his project seems to overlook the very salient features in scientific practice that 
underwrite its empirical success, in the first place.xiv    
 For Giere, as mentioned above, the model (understood in the cognitive sensexv) and its 
protocols dually shaping theory-construction and theory-articulation takes center stage, in terms 
of being the essential unit of description in this explanatory “success story” usually attributed to 
‘mature’ scientific theories deemed (at the very least) as reliable.  A particular example of such a 
model Giere discusses (1985, 75-82; 1988, 64-81) is that of the one-dimensional simple 
harmomic oscillator (1DSHO).  The 1DSHO, in its various mathematical formulations, 
characterizes a prototypical “exemplar” (Kuhn, 1962) insofar is it optimally instantiates all of 
Kuhn’s five essential values governing theory-choice (1977, 1998): consistency, accuracy, broad 
explanatory coherence, simplicity, and fecundity.xvi  Regarding the issue of fecundity, for 
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instance, the 1DSHO has been employed to a high degree of predictive success to diverse and 
manifold phenomena in classical and quantum mechanics.xvii  For the sake of simplicity, one can 
consider the 1DSHO in terms of the theory of classical mechanics only—which would involve 
(in the case of translational motion) an ideal uniformly dense mass (m) connected to a massless 
spring with stiffness parameter k sliding on a frictionless horizontal surfacexviii characterized by 
initial conditions (x0, p0) (position and momentum)xix whose time-evolution in (x, p) phase- space 
is governed by the differential equations (Hamilton’s equations of motion): 
(Eqn 2.1) 
p
H
dt
dx
∂
∂
=
  
x
H
dt
dp
∂
∂
−=   
The function ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )txVtpTtptxH +=,  is the system’s “Hamiltonian” representing (in this 
simple case) a direct sum of functions T and V (homogeneous in p and x)xx which in turn 
represent respectively the system’s kinetic energy: ( ) ( )
m
tppT
2
2
=  and potential energy: 
( ) ( )221 tkxxV = . 
 Giere asks, in this particular case: “[W]hat is the relationship between theoretical models, 
so conceived, and real oscillating systems such as bouncing springs, pendulums, and vibrating 
molecules?” (1985, 78). According to Giere, the answer depends on how one interprets the 
model’s modal scope, of which he suggests six progressive cases (1985, 83): 
Case 1. Extreme empiricism: The 1DSHO model (i.e., ‘model’) simply agrees with observed positions 
and velocities to the present time. 
Case 2. Extended empiricism: The model agrees with all observed positions and velocities 
past, present, and future.  
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Case 3. Actual empiricism: The model agrees with all actual positions and velocities whether 
observed or not.  
Case 4. Modal empiricism: The model agrees with all possible positions and velocities of the 
real system. 
Case 5. Actual realism: The model agrees with the actual history of all (or most) system 
variables.  
Case 6. Modal realism: The model agrees with all possible histories of all (or most) system 
variables. 
 
Consider (pace the problems associated with verisimilitude as briefly mentioned in passing in n. 
i. and n. vi. below) the phrase “agrees with” to paraphrase a similarity relation (both in terms of 
respect as well as degree—e.g., n. xv. below.) “The designated real system is similar to the 
proposed model in specified respects and to specified degrees.” (1985, 80) Giere argues that Van 
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is best characterized in terms of case 3, i.e., constructive 
empiricism is actual empiricism.  Constructive realism, on the other hand, whether broadly or 
narrowly interpreted, instantiates cases 6 or 5 respectively, i.e., modal or actual realism. 
 So according to Giere’s claims, realism versus anti-realism is an issue which can reduce 
to questions concerning modality.xxi  Prior to subjecting Giere’s constructive realism to 
Chalmer’s modal rationalism (which I present in the following section below) it is important to 
take note of several key issues distinguishing the above cases: 
(CR-1): What distinguishes realism from empiricism has primarily to do with the issue 
conceivability (i.e., epistemic possibility according to Chalmers): The realist makes a 
strong modal similarity claim by quantifying over all (or most) system variables which 
can (for instance) be potentially generated by all conceivable mathematizations (modulo 
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consistency and relevance).xxii  The empiricist, on the other hand, would remain (at best) 
metaphysically and semantically agnostic: An observable oscillatory system ultimately is 
mediated via its position and momentum, to an agreed-upon accuracy.xxiii Any extra 
variables generated by some mathematization thereof, should at best (to recall Van 
Fraasen’s quip) be seen as “imaginative pictures” aimed at ‘saving the phenomena’ 
ultimately indexed by x and p. 
(CR-2): “All possible histories” represent counterfactual cases (i.e., metaphysical or ‘secondary’ 
possibility).  Metaphysical possibility characterized counterfactually is something all 2D 
semanticists (Chalmers, Kaplan, Stalnaker, etc.) agree upon—as it is ultimately based on 
Kripkean (1980) considerations rendered precise through intensional semantics (a subject 
to be discussed in greater detail in the following section below.)  Laying such niceties 
aside, however, it is intuitively appealing that metaphysical possibility should be 
characterized counterfactually: Certainly certain facts about the actual world (known a 
posteriori) must presuppose any entertainment of possible worlds.  Varying such 
counterfactuals in the above case amounts simply to solving the Hamilton equations of 
motion for different (i.e., other than the actual) initial conditions.  Again, the antirealist 
views such variations by demurring from making any metaphysical commitments thereon 
vis-à-vis the model.  The modal realistxxiv (or strong constructive realist) on the other 
hand insists that such variations agree with robust metaphysical possibilities. 
(CR-3): Combining (CR-1) and (CR-2), the constructive realist can then infer a bold 
conceivability-possibility claim which I shall analyze further according to Chalmers 
(2002) in the following section below.  
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3. Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism-A Brief Overview 
Certainly since Kant (1781, 1965) lively interest has burgeoned concerning the question of 
the nature of any interrelation among epistemology, metaphysics, and semantics, with their 
associated fundamental distinctions of a priori/ a posteriori, necessity/contingency, and 
analyticity/syntheticity (Baehr (2006), Casullo (2002), 95; Nimtz (2005), 11; etc.)xxv  Since S. 
Kripke (1980) interest in exploring this question continues to burgeon with especial liveliness.  
3.1 Modal Rationalism’s Ancestor: Kripke’s Intensional Semantics 
Although (as I briefly mentioned in § 1. above) I argue here that Chalmers’ modal 
rationalism should not be reduced to certain (tendentious, by the lights of some of his critics) 
interpretative claims he advances concerning 2DS in his (2002) as well as in other sources (1996, 
Chalmers & Jackson (2001), etc.), it hardly follows that brief mention should not be made 
concerning this particular semantic research program from which, he as well as others (Kaplan 
(1989a, b), Stalnaker (1978, 2004)), articulate their positions.  As in the previous section, in 
which I articulated elements of Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, for the central reason 
that Giere’s and others’ claims (Hacking (1982, 1998), Churchland & Hooker, Eds. (1985)) were 
some of his respondents, so Chalmers, Kaplan, and Stalnaker’s 2DS have evolved vis-à-vis 
Kripke’s (1980) particular development of intensional semantics. “[I]ntensional semantics is 
driven that we can model the representational properties of our language by assigning intensions 
to terms and sentences.  From this, a significant meta-semantical condition follows meaning and 
is intimately linked to modality.” (Nimtz (2007), 2) 
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Nimtz (2007, 1-2) summarizes such meta-semantical conditions of intensional semantics 
below, for any sentence S in language Σ and for any world w—i.e., a “comprehensive 
counterfactual alternative to the way our actual world is,” (1) in totality j    : 
(A.)  Meaning is representational: Any sentence S’s literal meaning is based on its capacity to 
represent states of affairs, facts, etc. 
(B.) Truth conditions of S = S’s representational content: I.e., the way S represents can be gauged in 
situations in which S is true. 
(C.) Truth-conditions are truth-value distributions over possible worlds: For any world w ∈ j   in 
accords with S’s claim, S’s truth-conditions can be specified by assigning a valuation                 
v: Σ ×j   → { T , ⊥} such that: v(S, w) = T. 
(D.) Extension is compositional: S’s formal structure is determined by the reference(s) of its 
descriptive terms. “[T]he extension of a sentence in a possible world is determined by the 
extension of its constituent terms have in that world.” (2) 
(E.) Intension is compositional:  This automatically follows from the very notion of intension, which 
is characterized as a function and hence is structure-preserving regarding the (essentially 
Boolean) set-theoretic connectives of its domain, as well regarding the (associative) 
compositional map °. 
  To spell these generally technical points out in more concrete detail, consider the last 
condition (E.) in terms of Kripke’s particular approach (Winstanley (2007), 20).  Intensions can 
be partitioned into the following classes: 
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(i.) Term Intensions: fT:  j   → E  where E  is the class of extensions. 
(ii.) Sentence Intensions: fΣ:  j   → V where V is the set of truth-values.xxvi 
(iii.) Predicate Intensions: fP:  j   → Π where Π is the set of classes or properties. 
(iv.) Singular Intensions: fσ:  j   → b where b  is the set of individual objects. 
So, to illustrate by way of simple example, consider the sentence S: ‘Bill Gates is rich.’  In 
(binary) logic, the sentence’s intension  fΣ:  j   → { T , ⊥} of course assigns the actual world    
wa ∈ j    the value T, i.e., for S ∈ Σ:  fS(wa) = T.  Its subject term is of course singular, with 
intension fb:  j   → {b}, in which {b} is the singleton containing b (the logical constant denoting 
the proper name: ‘Bill Gates’).  The sentence’s predicate intension  fR:  j   → ΠR in which  ΠR = 
{x| Rx}, where R is the ‘is rich’ predicate.  Now, at wa in the substitution instance in the free formula 
[b/x]Rx ≡ Rb yields the true statement, which is tracked by the compositional characteristic of the 
intensionsxxvii: fS(wa) = fb∨R(wa) = (fb° fR)(wa) = fR(fb(wa)) = fR(b) = Rb. 
  More important, however, note that the singular intension fb assigns all worlds to the 
singleton {b}, i.e., proper names are rigid designators: Their singular intensions pick out the 
same object in every world where that object happens to exist.  In this particular instance, the 
predicate intension for ‘_is famous’ does not rigidly designate, clearly, since there’s nothing 
substantial about being ‘famous’ in any metaphysically robust way. (One doesn’t talk of nature 
‘carved at the joints’ according to such social values, obviously.)  On the other hand, natural kind 
predicates like ‘_is H2O’ rigidly designate, since metaphysically speaking this predicate is the 
actual reference (Putnam, 1975) of the natural kind (likewise rigidly designated) term ‘water.’  
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Hence identity statements like “Water is H2O,” “’Hesperus’ is ‘Phosphorous’,” etc., are 
necessary by virtue of the necessity of identity: ∀xy[ x = y →  (x = y)] and because their subject 
and predicate terms (proper names, natural kinds, actual references) rigidly designate.   
  Epistemically, however, such identifications of water with H2O, etc., are clearly a 
posteriori.xxviii  Thus, “necessary truth and a priori knowledge do not coincide.  Pace Kant, 
metaphysics is autonomous from epistemology.” (Nimtz, (2005), 3) Furthermore, objects and 
samples themselves, so rigidly designated, determine their own intension, not how one identifies 
them. Hence, “Kripke concludes that the identifying knowledge a competent speaker associates 
with his terms cannot be what determines the reference and truth-conditions of his expressions.  
Pace Frege, semantics is autonomous from epistemology.” (ibid) 
  3.2 The General 2DS Response 
  One can appreciate the (superficially) historical parallels between B. Van Fraassen (1980) 
and S. Kripke (1980).  Both are innovators, culminating by seeking to transform their respective 
traditions (e.g., empiricism and intensional semantics, respectively).  Both make bold and 
original claims, upsetting decades if perhaps not centuries’ worth of largely unquestioned 
fundamental assumptions concerning certain basic “isms” in philosophy and in science.xxix  And 
finally, both had their host of critical respondents who argue that their claims ultimately under-
reach to the extent that they are unable to support, in a top-heavy fashion, what perhaps appear 
secunda facie as ham-fisted pronouncements: Giere, as discussed above, accuses Van Fraassen 
of not having delved deeply enough into the empirical study of theory-formation and articulation 
in the sciences to support his constructively “empirical” thesis.  By the same token, despite 
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significant differences in mutual interpretation, the 2DS research program of Chalmers, Kaplan, 
and Stalnaker evolved as a similarly critical response to Kripke and Putnam’s intensional 
semantics: It is not enough to characterize meaning in terms of variations of truth-conditions vis-
à-vis certain facts.xxx  One must also consider what the sentences themselves mean, i.e., the 
speaker’s intention (and intentionality), in some key instances involving indexical claims.xxxi  
Certainly, for that matter, the 2DS perspective holds that Kripke’s project is not fit enough nor 
even sufficiently developed enough, to warrant his aforementioned counterclaims to Kant (i.e., 
that metaphysics is autonomous from epistemology) and to Frege (that metaphysics is 
autonomous with respect to semantics.)xxxii   
  As in the case of Hacking and Giere borrowing much in letter and in spirit from Van 
Fraassen’s notion of “constructive,” so in a similar manner 2D semanticists borrow and 
incorporate much (in letter and spirit) from intensional semantics: 
[T]wo-dimensional semanticists agree that our semantics has to account for this two-fold 
dependence on meaning and fact, and they agree that we can capture both dependencies 
relying on the apparatus of worlds and intensions familiar from intensional 
semantics…add[ing] the distinction between counterfactual and actual worlds…mak[ing] 
use of the threefold distinction of kinds of intension this effects…Put generally, the truth 
of an indexical sentence in some counterfactual world depends [on] what is the case in 
that world, and it depends on what is the case in the actual situation, or the actual world, 
it is uttered in…What [therefore] gets discriminated are two different roles the very same 
possible worlds can play (assuming we can specify for worlds considered as actual a 
centre consisting of a speaker, a place, and a time).  (Nimtz (2007), 4, italics added) 
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So, loosely speaking, on can conceive of the ‘horizontal’ axis characterized a’ la Kripke’s 
metaphysically counterfactual worlds (j  CF ) , referred to as ‘secondary intension’ in 2DS.  But 
there still remains the ‘vertical’ axis characterized as ‘primary’ intension and indexed according 
to worlds considered-as-actual (j  A ).  
  A few technical clarifications: 
(2DS-1): A necessary condition all 2D semanticists maintain is that the worlds considered-
as-actual must be centered.  I.e., in that regard, they must have sufficient 
metaphysical “internal” structure to support indexicality, involving (at the very 
minimum) individuation according to speaker s and his/her spatiotemporal 
location (xS,tS).  One could further fine-grain and add the speaker’s point of view 
(Winstanley (2007), n. 19, 23) which would necessitate S’s intentionality.  
Hencexxxiii:  j  A ⊆ j  CF. This centeredness is necessary since, as mentioned 
briefly above (and in n. xxxi below), indexical claims like “I am in NYC” not 
only vary in secondary intension (“I am in NYC”) but also nontrivially vary 
according to what the speaker means by “I” which obviously, for that matter 
depends upon who is the speaker and what his/her intentions are. 
(2DS-2): This “three-fold distinction of kinds of intension” alluded to above by Nimtz can 
be precisely characterized via the following: a.) Primary Intension: fP: j  A→ X? 
b.) Secondary Intension: fS: j  CF→ X ? c.) Diagonal: fD: j  A→ (j  CF→ X).  The 
co-domains X  represent generalized extension classes which can incorporate (as 
subclasses) the respective codomains (discussed in p. 14 above) of term, singular, 
Modal Rationalism and Constructive Realism 
 
19 
 
predicate, and sentence intensions, respectively. The diagonal intension fD 
“portray specifically how [an] expression’s primary and secondary intensions 
interlock.” (Nimtz (2005), 4) 
  So much for all that the two-dimensional semanticists agree upon.  Differences however 
arise regarding methodological, metaphysical, and epistemic ways of interpreting the ‘vertical’ 
dimension j  A.  Nimtz characterizes this interpretative difficulty in the form of two fundamental 
questions (ontological and epistemological, respectively) (5): 
  (Q1): What are actual worlds j  A? 
  (Q2): What is the precise reason 2DS requires j  A and primary intensions? 
Though I shall discuss Chalmers’ modal rationalism in particular, to get a sense of their varying 
projects I mention briefly in passing the answers to (Q1) and (Q2) that Kaplan (1989a,b) and 
Stalnaker (1978, 2004) offer as well, according to Nimtz. 
  Kaplan’s work on demonstratives distinguishes content from character.  The former 
applies when uttering a linguistic token, i.e. an expression occurring in a context—e.g., consider 
the token utterance S: ‘I am in NYC.’  The indexical token ‘I’ refers, but carries no meaning—
expressing the content of a proposition a speaker and hearer can grasp in that particular context 
of utterance.  On the other hand, the linguistic type ‘I’ in an expression-type (apart from context) 
‘I am in NYC’ does not refer, but carries meaning. (Grammatically, it is a first-person pronoun, 
etc.)  Its overall meaning expresses a conventional rule, i.e., character, that it refers to a 
particular speaker who would utter the token in a particular context. “[T]he sentence type [‘I am 
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in NYC’] does not express a proposition.  But having grasped its meaning, any speaker will 
know which proposition token of this type expresses if it uttered in a context.” (Nimtz, (2005), 
6).  Thus Kaplan’s interpretation of 2DS entails that actual worlds are contexts (in answer to 
(Q1)) and (in answer to (Q2)) “we need actual worlds and primary intensions to account for the 
context dependence of language.” (7) 
  Stalnaker’s ‘metasemantic’ approach on the other hand takes into explicit account the 
speaker/hearer’s mean of (re-)interpretation: When the content of utterance goes against some 
conventional rule (e.g., when a speaker says “Hesperus is Phosphorus” (‘h=p’) but transposed 
them by mistakexxxiv) “the hearer draws on his meta-semantic knowledge that the standard 
semantic meaning of some expression depend on features of our actual world.” (8)  I.e., the 
hearer may respond above to the speaker’s transposition by correcting him: “I understand what 
you’re saying, we’re talking about Venus.  However, ‘Hesperus’ [h] is the name of the evening 
star, but you said...”, etc.  Hence (answer to (Q1)) actual worlds are “possible alternative 
environments” one may have introduced certain terms in (i.e., in the above case, assigning h the 
name of the morning star.)  Actual worlds and primary intensions are needed “to capture actual-
world-dependence of semantic meaning and hence to describe metasemantic facts,” (ibid.), i.e., 
the answer to (Q2). 
  Chalmers’ approach, which of course I shall devote exclusive attention to in the 
following section, is distinguished from Kaplan’s and Stalnaker’s in namely being the most 
explicitly epistemic.  Where Kaplan and Stalnaker focus on content and character vis-à-vis 
utterance tokens and types, meta-semantic rules of assignment vis-à-vis reinterpretations modulo 
dependence of the (actual) world’s particular facts, respectively; Chalmers, on the other hand, 
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answers (Q1) and (Q2) by arguing that actual worlds are epistemic possibilities, which are 
required to “capture epistemic dependence on meaning.” (10)   
  In closing here, I may offer another analogy with the previous discussion—Hacking’s 
attention paid to Van Fraassen’s use of the term ‘constructive’ follows the latter’s program more 
to the letter, since Van Fraassen was specifically referring to experimental design and 
construction.  Giere, on the other hand, injected an explicitly epistemic approach—by ascribing a 
centrally cognitive approach characteristic of ‘constructive’ vis-à-vis modeling.  By the same 
token, Kaplan and Stalnaker appear to follow Kripke’s intensional semantics here to the letter, 
by applying 2DS to what may be viewed as anomalous or lacking in the Kripke-Putnam 
approach.  On the other hand, Chalmers appears to wrestle more with the spirit of Kripke’s 
approach by explicitly injecting a centrally epistemic role to counter Kripke’s conclusions contra 
Kant and Frege alluded to above: 
[Chalmers] maintains that Kant is right.  There is a deep link between necessity and a 
priority, for a sentence is epistemically necessary if and only if it is a priori.  Chalmers 
also holds that Frege is right.  Semantics is indeed rooted in epistemology.  For the 
identifying knowledge a competent speaker associates with her terms, as is revealed by 
the epistemic intensions she associates with it, precisely is what determines the reference 
and truth-conditions of her expressions.  Here, metaphysics is not autonomous from 
epistemology.  And neither is semantics. (Nimtz (2007), 10) 
  3.3 Modal Rationalism-The Heart of the Matter 
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  Openly challenging Kripke (1980) by professing an interpretative methodology which 
would, among other things, vindicate Kant and Frege, etc., is a risky enterprise.  Chalmers has 
his fair share of critical respondents (Bealer (2002), Winstanley (2007), Yablo (2002), just to 
name a few).  As I mentioned however in places throughout the above essay, there are good 
reasons to cleave the general issues centering on modal rationalism that Chalmers (2002) 
discusses, from his more pointedly and avowedly epistemic characterization of 2DS (1996, 
Chalmers & Jackson (2001)).  These issues are distinct, but obviously not disjunct: They overlap 
to the extent of necessitating, among other things, some exposition of Kripke’s intensional 
semantics and 2DS, as I endeavored to show above. 
  Chalmers (2002) never mentions Kant or Frege in any substantial way, and basically only 
explicitly discusses 2DS in an off-hand expository manner (166-167, 179).  The project here, in 
my view, shares a resonant theme with Casullo (2002), insofar as a serious attempt is made to 
epistemically characterize the a priori qua as a bona fide epistemic notion, in its own right.xxxv  
However, pace traditional epistemology past and present, Chalmers certainly does not tackle the 
issue in terms of attempting to positively characterize what is meant by ‘experience’ vis-à-vis the 
a priori’s notion of “non-experiential sources of justification.”  This, of course, is a core 
theoretical problem pertaining to the analysis of a prioricity per se (Baehr (2006), Casullo 
(2002), etc.).  Instead, appealing to the ubiquity of modal judgments we make, vis-à-vis 
epistemic conceivability and metaphysical possibility considerations (mention which was briefly 
made in § 1., above) Chalmers draws our attention to a venerable tradition in philosophy, 
utilizing a priori methods to make modal claims which “often…draw conclusions about matters 
of substantive metaphysics.” (2002, 145)  In this respect his project resembles Casullo’s, insofar 
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as they both offer non-reductive analyses of this (and other) epistemic categories treated as 
fundamental non-primitive analysanda subject to fruitful epistemological scrutiny.xxxvi  As the 
title ‘modal rationalism’ suggests, his point remains to elucidate how a clear methodological 
connection (without a conflation) mediated by modality from an ab initio epistemological basis 
to a metaphysical claim among other things comprises a cornerstone in manifold domains: 
(MR-1): We find this structure [(i.) Epstemic claim (what can be conceived) ⇒ (ii.) Modal claim 
(what is possible, what is necessary) ⇒ (iii.) Metaphysical claim (nature of things in the 
world)] in many different areas of philosophy; in arguments about whether the mental is 
reducible to the physical (or vice versa); about whether causation and laws are reducible 
to regularities in nature, about whether knowledge is identical to justified true 
belief…there is at least some plausibility in the idea that conceivability can act as a guide 
to metaphysical possibility. (Chalmers (2002), 145-146, italics added) 
  Chalmers’ opening claim (MR-1) above can certainly be extended into issues in the 
philosophy of science, as well as in the epistemic practices in many domains of science per se.  
The former point I make of course is the core thesis in this essay: Chalmers’ characterization of 
conceivability-possibility qua modality serves as an optimal framework for Giere’s modal claims 
in his constructive realism, and thus, in a more general sense, a substantial bridge may be built 
connecting elements of rationalism with realism, along lines informed by elements of 
contemporary 2DS and modal epistemology.   
  My second correlative claim above, which I will not address in much detail here (in the 
interests of space) may seem however faulty: Did not Hume already remind us that one should 
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never mix armchair a priorizing with bona fide, a posteriori empirical science?  Certainly 
Chalmers does not dispute that! “[I]t is very implausible that conceivability entails physical or 
natural possibility.” (2002, 146)  However, by the same token, Hume’s dictum can also be 
wielded as a heavy clubxxxvii, for it is equally naïve to claim that meaningful science does not (at 
least on occasion) follow the schema as outlined in (MR-1) above.  In particular, one need only 
witness all the fruitful research by those in the “cognitive turn” in philosophy of science 
elucidating the essential role played by the activity of scientists developing ‘thought-
experiments’.xxxviii (Giere (1985, 1988), Goldman, Ed. (1993), Nersessian (2002), Petitot, et. al., 
Eds. (1999), Sorensen (1992), etc.)  Contra “broadly Kripkean” (190) claims concerning the 
metaphysical necessity of natural laws, Chalmers likewise offers a similar point in defense of 
(MR-1) for the workaday scientist: 
(MR-2) [E]ven if not all conceivable worlds are metaphysically possible worlds, we need a 
rational modal concept tied to rational consistency or conceivability to best analyze the 
phenomena in question…even if all worlds with different laws of nature are 
metaphysically impossible, it will still be tremendously useful to have a wider space of 
logically possible worlds (or world-like entities) with different laws, to help analyze and 
explain the hypotheses and inferences of a scientist investigating the laws of nature.  
Such a scientist will be considering all sorts of rationally coherent possibilities involving 
different laws; she will make conditional claims and engage in counterfactual thinking 
about these possibilities; and she may have terms…that intuitively differ in meaning [i.e., 
‘color’ as used in quantum chromodynamics]…To analyze these phenomena, the wider 
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space of worlds is needed to play the role that [counterfactual] possible worlds usually 
play. (Chalmers (2002), 193) 
  Claims (MR-1) and (MR-2) applied to philosophy and to science, respectively, of course 
are instances of Chalmers’ articulated response to his answers to Nimtz’ (Q1) and (Q2), 
discussed in §3.2 above. (MR-2) in particular of course also serves to rationally ground Giere’s 
notions of the centrality of models, as discussed in §2.2 above.  It paves the way for an 
articulated exposition on how modality (claim (ii.) in (MR-1)) acts as the gateway between what 
goes on in the scientist’s mind and what gets eventually translated as reliable science, 
appropriately metaphysically conditioned. 
  So far, however, an anti-realist like Van Fraassen would probably not dispute anything I 
have discussed thus far, in this section.xxxix  As suggested by Giere, the issue distinguishing anti-
realism (specifically empiricism) from realism has to do with how narrow or wide one makes the 
modal gate—in order to pass over from the workshop of thought-experimentation and modeling 
into the fields of metaphysical possibility (recall Giere’s six cases, discussed in §2.2 above).  
Wide is the gate indeed, for the realist: E.g., Giere’s cases 5 and 6—the model agrees with all (or 
most) of the system’s variables (whether mathematically concealed or revealed) for the actual 
history (i.e., individuated by the initial conditions of the system in the actual world-case 5) or all 
possible histories (i.e., counterfactual worlds, i.e. the metaphysical possibilities-case 6) of the 
system.  
  Chalmers also has reasons to argue for such a wide modal gate leading one from 
(epistemic) conceivability to (metaphysical) possibility.  In his concluding section (194-195) he 
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distinguishes among three grades of modal rationalism based on qualified kinds of conceivability 
and possibility: 
(MR-3) Weak Modal Rationalism (WMR): Ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary 
possibility. 
  Strong Modal Rationalism (SMR): Negative ideal primary conceivability entails 
possibility. 
  Pure Modal Rationalism (SMR): Positive conceivability ≡ Negative conceivability ≡ 
Possibility. 
The distinctions and qualifications ‘ideal’ (versus prima and secunda facie), ‘positive’ versus 
‘negative’, ‘primary’ versus ‘secondary’ I have not (as of yet) elaborated on, but are important 
for several reasons (both practical and theoretical).  On a theoretical note, some of Chalmer’s 
critics (in particular Winstanley (2007)) as briefly mentioned in §3.2 above have accused him (a’ 
la Salmon (1982) contra Kripke (1980)) of pulling metaphysical rabbits out of semantic hats: 
Why should we believe that diagonal intensions are best understood as epistemic 
intensions? Aside from a more or less plausible story, Chalmers has done little to 
convince us that this is the case…a 2DS satisfying the Core Thesis would be appealing, 
and a response to the Kripkean necessary a posteriori…In addition, running repairs to the 
‘golden triangle’ of meaning [semantics], reason [epistemology], and modality 
[metaphysics] would be out of this world.  However, Chalmers has so far given us no 
reason to believe that the golden triangle is anything other than ‘out of this world’ qua 
illusory or unreal, or at least, non-actual. (23-24) 
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  Though spatial considerations prevent me from launching into a full-fledged analysis of 
Winstanley’s objections, I believe that several qualifications are in order.  For starters, 
Winstanley invokes Chalmers’ (2004) ‘Core Thesis’: “For any sentence S, S is a priori if and 
only if S has a necessary diagonal intension.”xl  (Winstanley (2007), 22).  In the main, as I have 
pointed out in previous sections, Winstanley and others direct their focus against Chalmers’ 
particular interpretation of 2DS—the above Core Thesis is one obvious instance thereof.  
Winstanley for instance attacks it by finding counterexamples in both directions: He drums up 
Stalnaker to show there can be sentences which are a priori and diagonally contingent, and 
conversely uses Davies to show that there can be sentences which are diagonally necessary but 
not a priori. (24-26) Whatever one is to make of these counterinstancesxli, by and large they 
would only undermine the strongest rendition of modal rationalism, namely MR-3’s pure modal 
rationalism. So to dismiss Chalmers’ larger philosophical points because of this strikes me as 
premature at best, if not an outright red herring. 
  On a practical level, the nuanced distinctions Chalmers offers applied to conceivability 
and possibility (e.g., ‘primary/secondary,’ ‘negative/positive,’ ‘ideal/prima (& secunda) facie’) 
are especially appealing to philosophers of science like Giere and others who are sensitive to 
fine-grained epistemic and modal notions.  I daresay a scientist or a mathematician would find 
these nuances of interest as well: Consider a mathematician offering a ‘sketch of a proof’ (or 
similarly a physicist doing a ‘back of the envelope calculation’) for the existence of a solution—
and finding nothing preliminarily wrong in his reasoning.  This would be an instance of a notion 
which is prima facie positively conceivable.  Consider more subtle cases—for a dyed-in-the-
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wool constructive (e.g. Intuitionist) mathematician rejecting all indirect proofs, she is rejecting 
the sufficiency of using reasoning based on negative conceivability alone, etc. 
  Chalmers presents a rather nuanced and intricate analysis and exposition of the above 
eight different cases for conceivability and two for possibility.xlii  Spatial considerations prevent 
me from highlighting every subtlety, moreover my aim is to concentrate on the distinctions 
relevant for the modal rationalism – constructive realism rapprochement, as summarized in the 
tables below.  The upper rows and leftmost column (italicized) are the appropriate terms to 
substitute on (as a conjunct) on the left hand side of the biconditional:  
 “S is [left column entry] & [top row entry] & [second row entry] conceivable iff __________.”   
The individual entries under column and row header are the terms to substitute on the 
biconditional’s right hand side: 
 
Conceivability 
positively negatively 
primarily secondarily primarily secondarily 
prima facie an agent can 
envision S as 
actual 
an agent can envision S 
as counterfactual 
an agent cannot 
rule out ~S as 
actual 
An agent cannot rule 
out ~S as 
counterfactual 
ideally an agent can 
coherently 
envision S as 
actual  
an agent can coherently 
envision S as 
counterfactual 
It is not a priori 
that actually ~S 
It is not a priori that 
counterfactually ~S 
         Table 3.3.1-Conceivability Types 
   “Envision” and “coherently envision” are technical notions—akin to how many in the 
‘cognitive tradition’ (Giere (1985, 1988), Goldman (1993), Nersessian (2002), Petitot et. al. 
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(1999), Sorensen (1992), etc.) speak, in the case of mental imaging and forming analog 
representations.  Visualization is not a necessary condition.  Chalmers characterizes envisioning 
in terms of exercising “modal imagination”: “Modal imagination is used here as a label for a 
certain sort of familiar mental act.  Like other such categories, it resists straightforward 
definition.  But its phenomenology is familiar.” (Chalmers (2002), 151).  Moreover, in terms of 
how one “envisions” corresponds to forming positive conceptions: 
Positive conceivability rather than negative conceivability, seems to be what philosophers 
have in mind when discussing conceivability…the sort of clear and distinct modal 
intuition invoked by Descartes…reflects the practice in the method of conceivability as 
used in contemporary philosophical thought experiments.  (155, italics added) 
Coherently envisioning is perhaps the most tendentious epistemological notion, related to ideal 
conceivability.  It is inevitably vague, but Chalmers chooses it to avoid the undesirable extremes 
of defining ideal conceivability too broadly, i.e., in terms of being conceivable “upon ideally 
rational reflection” with respect to some cognitive agent—even if that agent happens only to be 
God—or too narrowly, i.e., conceivable under ideal rational reflection only according to human 
cognition: 
I will not try to give a substantive characterization of what good reasoning consists in, or 
what counts as a cognitive limitation to be idealized away from.  I suspect any such 
attempt would turn out to be open-ended and incomplete…the notion of conceivability 
[in any case, whether ideal or prima facie] is not obviously worse off than the concept of 
knowledge.  (148) 
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  Regarding the (two) cases of possibility—i.e. primary versus secondary, Chalmers 
defines them in terms of primary and secondary intension (recall §3.2 above).  Recall: Given a 
world w and a statement S, if w is considered actual, then the truth-value of S (in w) is S’s 
primary intension. (163). Similarly, if w is considered counterfactually, then the truth-value of S 
(in w) is S’s secondary intension.  (This is just a paraphrase of the more technical functional 
characterization of intension, as discussed in §§3.1, 3.2 above.)  Hence, S is primarily possible if 
S’s primary intension is true in some possible world w. S is secondarily possible if S’s secondary 
intension is true in some possible world w. (164) 
  The nuanced epistemic distinctions that Chalmers offers, that I summarized (perhaps a bit 
glibly) above is enough to keep the metaphysician, logician, semanticist, epistemologist, 
philosopher of mind, philosopher of science and (as I suggest) in certain cases, the 
mathematician, the mathematical and/or theoretical physicistxliii busy for quite some time.  (As I 
mentioned in passing in n. xlii below, nowhere does Chalmers speak of negative possibilia, but 
this is by no means a trivial issue.  Certainly the issue is worthy to investigate as a research 
problem for the modal rationalist.)  Though a cognitive philosopher of science of the likes of 
Giere might be interested, vis-à-vis the investigation of model-based reasoning, to explore all 
eight different epistemic modes as presented in Table 3.3.1 above, in terms of Chalmers’ modal 
rationalism, he restricts the scope of his investigations to include only ideal primary negative and 
positive conceivability vis-à-vis possibility. This is obviously understandable, due to the suitably 
idealized nature of the topics he is investigating here and elsewhere. 
  3.4 Anomalies in Modal Rationalism—And Chalmers’ Treatment of Them 
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  Regarding the three different kinds of modal rationalism he presents in his conclusion 
(MR-3), i.e., weak, strong, and pure, Chalmers discusses problem cases or anomalies which 
distinguish the three renditions.  This can also be of interest to the cognitive philosopher of 
science, especially of the Kantian bent, as such questions Chalmers poses attempt to scope out 
the possible limits of cognition-in-action.xliv  The three questions Chalmers poses, and attempts 
to answer, are: 
(MR-4) Q1. Are there strong necessities? 
   Q2. Are there generalized inscrutabilities? 
    Q3. Are there open inconceivabilities? 
Before summarizing what these anomalies connote, it is helpful to mention here what Chalmers’ 
assessments are: He claims to present a “strong case against strong necessities”, offer “tentative 
reasons” to doubt in the existence of inscrutables, and admits that “the status of open 
inconceivabilities is unclear.” (195)  Nevertheless, “each of these three is a distinctive and 
substantial philosophical project, and…the investigation of each raises deep philosophical 
questions.” (ibid)  To pitch a case for pure modal rationalism, however, all three questions must 
be answered in the negative.  But it is precisely pure modal rationalism that suggests repairing 
the “golden triangle” among semantics, epistemology, and metaphysics, that Winstanley (as I 
mentioned above) attacks Chalmers on.  But as evidenced in Chalmers’ (2002) essay here, and 
his careful qualifications of the associated problems, clearly modal rationalism does not entail 
pure modal rationalism.  So again, Winstanley’s objections appear all the more as red herrings. 
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  As far as the other renditions of modal rationalism (weak and strong) go, clearly they are 
of greater relevance for the modal considerations suggested in Giere’s constructive realism.  To 
paraphrase weak and strong modal rationalism (WMR and SMR), they basically state that in the 
weak case positive (ideal, primary) entails primary possibility, whereas in the strong case, 
negative (ideal, primary) possibility entails possibility simpliciter (whether primary or 
secondary).  Obviously in the latter case conceivability tracks possibility more closely than in the 
former.  For instance, even if a scientist has no clue about how to formulate a hypothesis to 
explain some recalcitrant phenomena, if there is no a priori way to rule out the non-existence of 
such phenomena modulo any hypothesis, actually conceived, then by the lights of SMR, it is 
perfectly possible that a future theory may offer a cogent explanation thereof.  To name one 
instance, one could apply SMR regarding some of the schemes involving speculations 
concerning anomalous quantum phenomena surrounding non-locality that begin from the 
paradoxes of non-locality, rather than seek to “resolve” them (see Aharonov & Rohrlich (2005)).  
Provided, however, that none of these considerations prima facie result in outright incoherence.  
“Being a physicist is no barrier to incoherence.” (Schaffer (2003), 25)   
  Certainly, however, the workaday scientist would be more interested in scoping out 
positively conceivable hypotheses, even if this may restrict the domain in terms of gauging what 
may be possible.  In this regard, though perhaps philosophically tepid, WMR would still prove 
itself to be of interest for the scientist as well as the constructive realist like Giere—if for no 
other reason than that WMR provides some philosophical underpinnings for Giere’s case 5, i.e. 
actual realism, discussed in §2.2 above: The actual realist considers the model to agree with the 
actual history of all (or most) of the system’s variables.  This is an instance of WMR, since a 
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model is an obvious product (achievement, really) of primary positive conceivability, and to 
claim (as Giere does) that all or most of its variables (whether hitherto mathematized yet or not) 
agrees with those of the system in terms of its actual history is an example of claiming that such 
ideal conceptions entail primary possibility—i.e. a possible world conceived as actual.  
  However, for all of this to work, some of the anomalies as presented in (MR-4) above 
must be ruled out.  Chalmers argues that that “a strong case” against strong necessities has been 
made (189-192) whose details I shall omit here, for spatial consideration, focusing instead only 
on his salient conclusion and some of his premises.  According to Chalmers: 
(MR-5) Statement S is a strong necessity if S is falsified in some positively conceivable 
situation conceived as actual, which nevertheless S is true in all possible worlds. 
“For such necessities to exist, the space of positively conceivable situations must outstrip the 
space of possible worlds.” (Chalmers (2002), 189).  That would of course be catastrophic.  To 
recall the discussion in §3.2 above, every 2D semanticist agrees that primary intension must 
entail centered worlds.  Hence: j  A ⊆ j  CF, where j  A are the worlds-conceived-as-actual, and 
j CF  are counterfactual worlds, i.e. metaphysical possibilities.  To establish that strong 
necessities exist would serve as a counterexample to this necessary condition, and hence wreck 
the whole edifice of 2DS.  This, among other things, is why strong necessities must be ruled out, 
to establish WMR. 
  To establish SMR, (Q2) above likewise must be answered in the negative, i.e., 
generalized inscrutabilites must be ruled out.  “Tentative reasons” have been offered (174-184) 
whose details once again I omit.  “[I]f scrutability is true, generalized scrutability is probably 
Modal Rationalism and Constructive Realism 
 
34 
 
true [and therefore there probably cannot be any generalized inscrutabilities]…[and] its truth 
would seem to reflect something deep about concepts, truth, and reason.” (184)  Chalmers 
formulates his scrutability thesis in terms of qualitative completeness: 
(MR-6) Knowing how the world is (qualitatively) entails that we know what our terms 
refer to and [therefore] whether or not our statements are true. (174) 
Though Chalmers builds up to the idea of generalized scrutability with quite a bit of technical 
rigor, the basic notion of generalized scrutability is reasonably perspicuous: It maintains that a 
sufficiently completely qualitative account (i.e., a qualitative complete description or QCD) of 
the relevant features of a situation is a sufficient condition to determine the reference of the terms 
being used.  “Intuitively, a [QCD]…is a basic description from which many truths can be 
derived…the scrutability thesis…come[s] down to the claim that the fundamental natural truth 
about the world, in conjunction with indexical truths, implies all (a priori) truths.” (176) 
  From this basic intuition, Chalmers ‘precisifies’ it through the notions of epistemic 
completeness: 
(MR-7) Statement[/s] D is [/are] epistemically complete iff: (i.) D is epistemically possible 
[i.e., primarily possible: there exists some world w* conceived as actual such that 
D is true in w*] and (ii) for any F , if D∧F is epistemically possible, then D→F. 
(176) 
From (MR-7) and QCD, then, the scrutability thesis is put forth: 
(MR-8) Scrutability thesis :If D is a QCD truth, then for all S, S ⊃ (D→S).xlv  (178) 
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Loosely speaking, what the scrutability thesis MR-8 maintains is that if D is a QCD truth, then D 
is epistemically complete, i.e. satisfies MR-7.  Generalized scrutability extends MR-8 to apply 
not only to a QCD of our actual world, but to any QCD, i.e., to any world w conceived as actual. 
“[I]t would be odd if scrutability turned out to be true in this world, but not in others; the thesis 
seems to have a much more general source than that.” (183) 
 If the general scrutability thesis is incorrect, then general inscrutables could exist. Hence, 
the negative conceivability linkage with possibility (whether primary or secondary) would be 
broken, or SMR would not hold.  Relating this to Giere’s case 6 (modal realism) i.e., the model 
agrees with all possible histories of all (or most) system variables, is an instance of how SMR 
can underwrite this claim.  A model which is qualitatively incomplete is an approximation an 
(ideally) qualitatively complete model M*xlvi, which is ideally negatively conceivable and hence, 
entails possibility (both primary and secondary).  Giere’s case 6 captures the secondary instance, 
as signaled by the metaphysical counterfactual notion “all possible histories”—i.e., worlds 
counterfactually conceived in which the system had initial conditions differing from its actual 
ones. 
 Chalmers is less sure of himself that there are no general inscrutables.  Aside from some 
of the problems he discusses, i.e., vague predicates, moral claims, etc., one could add into the 
mixture some of the debates concerning the completeness of quantum mechanics: Regarding the 
Bohr-Einstein debate (which essentially still goes on, in various and sundry guises) Bohr would 
argue that quantum theory is epistemically complete, but not qualitatively complete: One could 
argue that Bohr complementarity is a denial of qualitative completeness—in principle, no 
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theories can offer up a QCD—quantum theory cannot even give a complete qualitative 
description in phase space (position and momentum).  But pace Einstein, this is no fault of the 
theory, just a metaphysical fact about our world.  Hence, by denying the antecedent of MR-8, but 
affirming its consequent, Bohr could formally agree with MR-8, i.e., scrutability.  But 
metaphysically, he would not, since the metaphysically interesting instance would be if both the 
antecedent and the consequent are true (i.e., there are QCDs, there is such a thing as epistemic 
completeness).  Hence Bohr would probably include some of the aspects of quantum phenomena 
as instances of inscrutables.   
Einstein, of course, argued for the exact opposite: His belief in local realism would 
certainly induce him to assent to QCD.  For Einstein, it was therefore a major defect of quantum 
theory that in principle it could not yield up qualitatively complete descriptions.  Since a good 
theory must in principle be able to do this, by the lights of MR-8, then quantum theory must be 
epistemically incomplete.  Now another alternative for Einstein would have been to deny MR-8, 
and in so doing, reject the inference.  He certainly did not do that, as he insisted all throughout 
the debates that quantum mechanics is incomplete, full stop. Hence one could argue that for 
Einstein, there should be no talk of inscrutables, at least not when doing physics! Any physical 
theory that suggested otherwise was simply a bad theory.   
Last of all, the issue in which Chalmers is the least sure of himself is the denial of Q3—
that there cannot be any open inconceivabilities.  Though perhaps the most philosophically 
interesting—all the fuss is about restoring the ‘golden triangle,’ vindicating Kant and Frege, by 
way of aspiring to establish some knock-down argument for PMR, etc.; at least in terms of the 
issue of realism in the philosophy of science, let alone concerning the issues of interest of 
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scientists per se, undoubtedly this is of least concern.  In fact, many may root for arguing against 
Chalmers here, as the very idea of PMR may prima facie offend scientists’ and some 
philosophers’ Humean intuitions. (Although I already mentioned above how Humean 
empiricism—i.e., Giere’s extreme empiricism, case 1.--run  amok and wielded as a heavy club 
can render science literally impossible to do, as certainly countless others including Kant (1781, 
1965) have voiced similar objections).  Nevertheless, as my points illustrate above, the 
philosopher of science (as well as the scientist) would undoubtedly be perfectly content to settle 
for less—i.e., WMR or SMR, as they both, as I argue above, underwrite Giere’s constructive 
realism. 
Nevertheless for the sake of closure it is useful to examine the arguments, albeit in a far 
more cursory fashion. If Q3 is answered in the affirmative, i.e., that open inconceivabilities exist, 
then the “Twilight Zone” (TZ) (statements which are negatively conceivable but not positively 
conceivable) would be non-empty. (183)  One might think that the emptiness of the TZ has 
already been established via SMR in its denial of general inscrutables.  But that is only half the 
story, i.e., the metaphysical half.  Inconceivabilities represent the other aspect, i.e., the epistemic 
anomaly for PMR.  In other words, the TZ is partitioned into two classes: general inscrutabilities 
as well as open inconceivabilities. (188)  “[I]n order to close a potential gap between (ideal 
primary) negative and positive conceivability, it is necessary and sufficient to rule out 
generalized inscrutabilities and open inconceivabilities.” (188) Chalmers offers the following 
definition: 
(MR-9) S is an open inconceivability if for any QCD (of the actual world) DW: 
(i.)DW→~S, and (ii.) S is negatively conceivable. (187) 
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Instances of statements potentially behaving this way are of the variety that usually keep 
logicians and metaphysicians awake at night, but probably no one else.  Such statements would 
include: S1: “There are no QCDs of our world,” S2: “There are inconceivable features of the 
world,” S3: “There are intrinsic nonphenomenal properties,” (see Weatherston (2006)), etc.  
 Assuming SMR, which rules out generalized inscrutables, if one (however possible) 
could rule out by way of a general argument that no open inconceivabilities exist, then one can 
conclude that the TZ is empty.  To put it another way, the ‘NegPos’ claim, i.e., “ideal negative 
conceivability entails ideal primary positive conceivability,” (188) is logically equivalent to the 
claim that the TZ is empty. (Chalmers gives the proof of this proposition (188-189) whose details 
I omit here.)  Hence, armed with this claim, Chalmers also shows by way of simple argument 
that WMR & NegPos is logically equivalent to PMR. (195)  Here the argument is succinct 
enough to summarize: (⇒) Trivial: (NegPos nixes out the TZ so there is no reason to establish 
separately the non-existence of generalized inscrutables, etc.)  (⇐) Possibility entails negative 
conceivability, “no primary possibility is ruled out a priori.” (195)  This also entails positive 
conceivability, by way of PMR, which in turn entails WMR & general scrutability & no open 
inconceivabilities, which entails WMR & (empty TZ), which entails WMR & NegPos. 
 IV. Conclusion 
 I have endeavored to show by way of constructive example how, in principle, a case can 
be made for rationalism vis-à-vis scientific realism.  However, rather than argue my case in some 
‘top-down’ fashion, I chose, by way of ‘meta-induction’ to proceed from the bottom up, in the 
case of a concrete exemplar (in Kuhn’s sense).  This ‘base case’ took up the bulk of this paper, 
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which entailed characterizing Giere’s constructive realism in terms of Chalmers’ modal 
rationalism.  My hope is that if no gross errors on my part have been committed in establishing 
this linkage, then future papers can rigorously flesh out the ‘inductive step’ in the hopes of 
making my case more general.  Conservatively speaking, all I have shown here is how one 
particular kind of rationalism (modal) can enjoy a rigorously logical connection with one 
particular rendition of realism (constructive).  But again, I should hope that this is no mere 
example (which would not constitute an argument anyway) but an exemplar.  Au fond, though it 
may prove next to impossible to establish some of Chalmers’ stronger claims (let alone argue for 
the case that, as Nimtz suggests, he may vindicate Kant and Frege), certainly Chalmer’s weaker 
claims in the case he makes for modal rationalism prove fruitful enough, in shedding light on 
issues pertaining to scientific realism.  
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i
 In a broadly historical-methodological manner, Richard Boyd suggests a scientific realism based on programmatic 
measures.  “If scientific realism is true, then the methodological practices of science provide a reliable guide to 
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approximate truth about theoretical matters…only scientific realism could provide a satisfactory explanation for this 
fact.” (1985, 4)  As the title of his article suggests: 
If a theological precedent must be found, the obvious choice is the dictum attributed to Pope St. Celestine I 
(422-432; …[though] the attribution may be faulty…): “Lex orandi est lex credenti,” “the rule for praying 
is the rule for believing,” or (in a freer translation) “believe what is necessary to ‘rationally reconstruct’ 
liturgical practice.”  For “liturgical practice” put “scientific practice” and you get a strategy for the defense 
of scientific realism. (32)     
McMullin responds to Kuhn (1962, 1973) by suggesting that in Kuhn’s five values for theory-choice (1973): 
accuracy, consistency, broad explanatory scope, simplicity, and fecundity, “[t]he radical challenge [for Kuhn] is not 
rationality, but realism.” (1998, 132)  From a standpoint of scientific realism, McMullin argues that one can rank 
scientific revolutions in terms of depth and degree—thus disambiguating notion to a broad extent. (Can one really 
consider the ‘paradigm revolution’ regarding the discoveries of electrostatic phenomena associated with the Leyden 
jar on par with the breakdown of geocentrism?  According to McMullin, Kuhn’s (1962) broadly descriptive attempt 
to answer this question  remain unconvincing.)  But most importantly for McMullin, a realist can epistemically 
ground some of the of the above values in such a manner that the ant-realist cannot: Broad explanatory scope, for 
instance, becomes an epistemic norm for the realist—the extent exhibited by a theory regarding this particular value 
is in direct measure to the theory’s verisimilitude—which, at best, is underwritten by aesthetic considerations, for 
the anti-realist.  Hence, all things considered, the realist can appeal to more overtly rational principles concerning 
the particular negotiation of certain values, than can the anti-realist, even if (pace Salmon’s (1990) Bayesian 
overtures to Kuhn) no general rule-based framework can ground such values.   
The “pessimistic meta-induction” (PMI) argument of course objects to any methodological programmatic arguments 
for realism, based on rational principles (broadly construed)—how would a realist historically account for all the 
failures of theories, which is the rule, rather than the exception?—is the question put forth by the PMI.  To answer 
this, Psillos (1996) accuses the PMI of a fallacy of dichotomy-- a rational strategy based on realist presuppositions 
can for instance involve a divida et impera (“divide and conquer”) middle-ground claim which: “(i.) [I]dentifies the 
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theoretical constituents of past genuine successful theories that essentially contributed to their successes; (ii) shows 
that these constituents, far from being characteristically false, have been retained in subsequent theories of the same 
domain.” (S310)   
Stronger methodological and value-theoretically inspired claims, suggesting that the relation between realism is one 
akin to entailment, include J. J. C. Smart’s (1963) argument that “the canons of rational inference require scientific 
realism.” (Van Fraassen (1980, 1998), 1075).  Smart’s argument is premised upon Sellars’ (1962)  inference to the 
best explanation; i.e., as a rule of inference, one should always select the theory that provides the best explanation.  
ii
 To be sure, any attempts to precisely specify “demarcation criteria” which would presume to distinguish 
“externalist” and “internalist” studies (terms originally coined by Kuhn (1977) vis-à-vis the history of science) may 
prove themselves to be non-starters, given the methodologically open-ended nature (Scylla) of the enterprise as well 
as semantic (Charibdes) problem of vagueness.  Nevertheless, regarding the study of values in science within the 
broader context of social epistemology, Helen Longino (1990) for instance draws a distinction between “cognitive” 
versus “contextual.”  The former pertain specifically to values and norms particular to scientific practice broadly 
construed (e.g. Kuhn’s five values of theory-choice, see note (i) above).  The latter apply to a broader socio-cultural 
domain (involving both moral and non-moral values).  In her project, Longino envisions a notion of “objectivity” 
based on “transformative criticism,” which would entail (among other desiderata) a more dynamically reciprocal 
relationship between the cognitive vis-à-vis the contextual.  Such a broader discussion of Longino lies outside the 
scope of this essay.  However, I mention her distinctions in passing, to illustrate that although no precise 
methodological boundary may be drawn between “internal” versus “external” studies, it does not follow that they 
cannot be individuated, albeit (in the case of social epistemology) in an irreducibly coarse-grained fashion.        
iii
 To disambiguate this notion, as I explain as well in greater detail below, Ronald Giere’s “constructive realism” 
should not be confused with Ian Hacking’s (1982) version. 
iv
 Adopting elements of discrete and recursively constructive principles based on logico-algebraic procedures as a 
general method of philosophical argumentation is a notion discussed in Desmet (2008), whose domain of analysis in 
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particular is A. N. Whitehead’s (1929, 1979) process philosophy.  Certainly the approach I take here does not 
incorporate the formal level of rigor as suggested in Desmet’s notions of  “generalized mathematics”—hence my 
embedding the terminology of mathematical induction above in scare quotes.  This does not, however, suggest that 
such a more formally rigorous approach could not be implemented in a lengthier study.  In this brief essay, however, 
I mean to exposit the central and salient philosophical points, perhaps at the expense of sacrificing in abstract rigor.  
v
 Obviously, the authors I alluded to above (R. Boyd  and S. Psillos) represent only a very minute sample of the 
voluminous literature in scientific realism, giving just primary emphasis on historical and methodological aspects 
thereof.  Aside from Giere (1985, 1988) others advancing scientific realism from chiefly epistemological contexts, 
like Giere, ally themselves with the “cognitive turn” in philosophy of science (e.g., Goldman, 1993).  Still others 
avowing a form of scientific realism based primarily on formal logical principles (syntactic or semantic) include F. 
Rohrlich (1988, 1994), whose work itself draws primary emphasis from the “structuralist” tradition in the 
philosophy of the mathematical sciences (J. Sneed (1971), E. Scheibe (1997, 1999), etc.)      
vi
 Secunda facie, of course, (SR-1) as well as other more precise articulations of scientific realism introduce a 
Gordian knot of philosophical difficulties that some would claim are insurmountable to the extent that one must 
defer to some version of anti-realism as (if nothing else) the only viable means intellectual recovery.  Aside from the 
PMI alluded to in n. i above, other difficulties of course center on verisimilitude, theory-underdetermination, 
inductive fallacies, etc.  I mention these points in passing, though such issues lie beyond the scope of this essay. 
vii
 I.e., facts, which are devoid of spatio-termporal indexicality. A similar issue of course underlies some of the 
metaphysical questions surrounding the nature of causal relata: Are the constituents of the causal relation based on 
transcendent facts or immanent events? (Schaffer, 2007)  To the degree and extent that such transcendent features of 
the world can get individuated by scientific theories depends large on one’s presupposed theory of scientific 
explanation.  Such features would by and large be individuated in a maximally fine-grained fashion, should for 
example ascribe to P. Railton’s (1978, 1981) ‘ideal explanatory text’ causal account.  On the other hand, the issue of 
fineness or coarseness depends on the ‘explanatory store’ for P. Kitcher (1981) which itself is a function of its 
unifying capacity—loosely thought of as a dual-optimization procedure involving e.g. Kuhn’s values of simplicity, 
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explanatory coherence, and fecundity.  (Kitcher, of course, characterizes unification in far more explicitly rigorously 
precise set-theoretic terms).    
viii
 Lest one voice concern over a certain “impredicative” characteristic or even petitio principii in some of my points, 
insofar as I include the term “scientific” in the predicate of some of the sentences in which I discuss scientific 
realism, suffice it to consider herein “features of the world that are in principle scientifically scrutable” as 
metaphysically primitive.  Such features would necessarily involve dispositions that are not entirely constituted by 
intentionality—i.e., the latter being that peculiar mind-world relationship characterized by propositional attitudes 
and mental representation. (For a detailed synopsis and overview on dispositions, see M. Fara, 2006.)  Of course, 
this is not to say that such (in principle) scientifically scrutable features of the world cannot be characterized by 
some degree of intentionality—e.g., the study of color-perception.  For a more general discussion, see Petitot, et. al. 
(1999).    
ix
 Certainly, when reviewing some of the debates between realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science, such 
systematicity in many cases appears as sorely lacking, appearing in some cases as an all-out “intellectual brawl.”  
Though the puns and barbs can certainly prove entertaining (witness Arthur Fine’s (1984) accusations of ‘foot-
stomping realism’ and the very titles composed by some of Fine’s respondents like Alan Musgrave (1989)), 
nevertheless, to recall the Tudor musician and musicologist Thomas Ravenscroft, their overall intellectual effect 
seems to “burthen the wits…and maketh not the mist thinner.”  A little bit of general logical precision and  
methodological rigor suggested by modal rationalism can go a long way toward reconstructive clarity, in that regard.  
x
 Following Kuhn’s (1962) essential unit of description, i.e., the paradigm, a claim can be that Hacking and Giere’s 
descriptive units characterize different aspects of Kuhn’s. Though the connotation of “paradigm” has been accused 
of being hopelessly ambiguous by many of  Kuhn’s critics, nevertheless, mature sciences exhibit a paradigmatic 
feature with a complex internal dynamical structure with sub-constituents (analogous to a biological cell’s 
organelles) which are readily identifiable in a (more or less) regular fashion.  Such “organelles” or aspects include 
the “module” of theory-formation, which (in a dynamically reciprocal fashion) impacts the applications module, 
which likewise impacts the instrumentation/experimentation component.  The latter, in turn, impacts the nomology 
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(lawhood from empirical generalizations of generated data) component, which, lastly, informs the theory-formation 
module.  (1962, 10) This dynamical “virtuous circularity” indicates (for Kuhn) why mature sciences are essentially 
conservative: Aside from this relatively insular ‘homeostasis’ implied by this picture, serious anomalies 
precipitating radical paradigm-change are akin to “retooling” an industry’s basic manufacturing machinery.     
(1962, 76)  Vis-à-vis Kuhn’s paradigms, then, Hacking’s main focus is on the instrumentation and experimentation 
module, whereas Giere’s “models” would dwell at the interface between nomolgy and theory--insofar as in this 
context, laws can be viewed “tools for model-building” (Frisch, 2005, 11).  Giere’s models, from a standpoint of 
“theory-articulation,” would also reside at the interface between theory and application, for reasons that shall be 
made clear in the main discussion above.   
xi
 A theory T must have at least one model M in which “all actual phenomena fit inside.” (Van Fraassen (1980, 
1998), 1069).  Contrary to Giere’s notion of “model” informed by the cognitive sciences, Van Fraassen is refering to 
the semantic-logical sense—i.e., (semi-formally) a structure M in a formal system Σ instantiating or satisfying all its 
axioms ΑΣ ⊂ Σ.  (E.g., the infinite flat plane is a model for Euclidean geometry, while a curved surface is not.)   The 
tension between the two notions (cognitive versus semantic) is explored by Frisch (2005): A theory like classical 
electromagnetism (EM) is certainly rife with an open-ended set of models in the cognitive sense (e.g., modeling a 
steady-state current in terms of a continuous distribution of charges executing laminar flow) and in the semantic 
sense, its class of models is empty when applied to discrete distributions of charges (since EM’s basic “axioms” or 
principles—i.e., energy conservation, the Lorentz force law, and Maxwell’s Equations, form an inconsistent set in 
the discrete charge distribution case).   
xii
 Elsewhere, Van Fraassen writes: “Acceptance of theories…is a phenomenon of scientific activity…if a scientist 
accepts a theory, [s/]he involves [her/]himself in a certain sort of research programme…” (1980, 1998; 1069)  
Borrowing an analogy from the philosophy of religion, Van Fraassen claims that the constructive empiricist is akin 
to the agnostic who nevertheless accepts theism as making literal truth-claims.  Other anti-realists (e.g., positivists, 
phenomenalists, etc., who argue that a theory’s unobservables are just convenient fictions which paraphrase ways of 
elegantly classifying and categorizing sets of observation-claims) denying [1] are similar in this respect to liberal 
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theologians who would argue for a metaphorical interpretation of any of the theist’s claims one may deem prima 
facie as metaphysically problematic. 
xiii
 Such “other things” could involve the serendipitous isolation of “novel anomalies” (Kuhn, 1962).  Hacking (1982) 
describes in greater detail the relatively autonomous role experimentation plays, in terms of objectively isolating 
hitherto unknown phenomena through causal interaction within the broader patterns characterized by the particular 
causal nexus the instrumentation is embedded in. “No field in philosophy of science is more neglected than 
experiment….histories of science have become histories of theory…we lack even a terminology to describe the 
many varied roles of experiment.” (Hacking, 1982, 1998; 1153)  It needs emphasizing, however, that the 
metaphysics of causation is by no means trivial or perspicuous, to say the least. (See Schaffer  (2007)).  Depending 
on  what particular approach Hacking adopts (which he never discusses explicitly in the above) directly impacts the 
kind of position concerning realism qua experimentation he seeks to carve.  For instance, should he adopt a view 
that causal relata are transcendent facts, not immanent events, and individuated in a fine-grained manner like 
Fregean propositions—i.e., Dretske’s view (Schaffer, 2007, 11-12)—then his claims for the robust methodological 
autonomy of experimentation get greatly watered down.  On the other hand, his claims for the “objectivity” of 
phenomena qua regularities in a causal nexus would be certainly become rather plausible, in an immanentalist 
interpretation of relata (leaving aside here the issue concerning to what degree and extent of coarseness or fineness 
they should be individuated). 
xiv
 This irony is further compounded when one considers that Van Fraassen was one of the prominent developers of 
the semantic view of theories—i.e., the position in philosophy of science maintaining that theories are essentially 
characterized in terms of classes of models, not (pace the syntactic view of logical empiricists like Carnap) sets of 
sentences characterized in some suitably logically regimented formal system.  Moreover, as suggested by the 
passages above, contrary to some rather formal and meta-mathematical renditions of the semantic view classified as 
“structuralism” (Sneed, 1971; Scheibe, 1997, 1999; etc.) Van Fraassen’s approach stays close to the actual object-
language of science itself.  Nevertheless, what may perhaps prove indicative of  Giere’s concern, Van Fraassen does 
on occasion allude to more traditionally logical metalinguistic approach  in, e.g., his definition of “empirical 
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adequacy” qua model theory (n. xi above).  In this regard, the naturalistic reflexivity of the “cognitive turn” 
(Goldman (1993)) spearheaded by Giere exhibits a methodological uniformity: The object language and methods of 
cognitive science are, in turn, bootstrapped to the metalevel to account for issues (reflected e.g. in Kuhn’s values for 
theory-choice, n. i. above) of interest to philosophers of science: A theory’s explanatory coherence, predictive 
accuracy, etc.  
xv
 Loosely characterized as analogue representations essentially comprising coherent sets of mental images best 
depicted in terms of some dynamically evolving (weighted) graph or network: The “nodes”of this network  represent 
the exemplary idealizations themselves, the “links” depict the respects of similarity in which the model(s) 
characterizes the phenomena of interest, which can also be “weighted” in term of degrees of similarity (between the 
idealization and the phenomena mediated by the experimental instrumentation).  (Giere, 1988, 82-91).  See also 
Goldman (1993) and Nersessian (2002).  This notion of model is starkly contrasted with the logical-semantic 
sense—see n. xi. above. 
xvi
 See n. i. above. 
xvii
 E.g., celestial mechanics, semi-classical methods in quantum chemistry, quantum field theory, etc. 
xviii
 Depicting of course the case of a “closed” dynamical system evolving in phase space, whose Hamiltonian 
becomes a “constant of the motion,” i.e., H = E = const.  In other words, energy conservation applies.  Adding 
physically path-dependent non-conservative dissipation terms like friction to potential term V introduce “open” 
systems in which, topologically speaking, their solution-trajectories can “fill” sub-regions in 2D phase space, in the 
sense that the such trajectories do not trace out closed families of elliptical curves, but rather (exponentially) 
decaying spirals. 
xix
 The same mathematical procedures can be generalized under suitably ideal conditions of systems consisting of N 
constituents in 3 dimensional physical space, in which case the fundamental variables of position and momentum are 
generalized as 3N-dimensional column arrays (vectors) in a 6N dimensional phase space. 
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xx
 Though linearly independent, there is still a connection between x and p: p(t) = m dx/dt  --at least for simple systems 
in which m remains constant.  For more general cases (in which mass can vary over time, e.g., rocketships, etc.) 
then:  p(t) =  d/dt (m(t)x(t)) = ( dm/dt)x(t)  + m(t)dx/dt   
xxi
 To be sure, modality is not the only issue distinguishing constructive empiricism from constructive realism, for 
Giere. Though lying outside the scope of my general discussion here in this essay, it deserves mentioning (in 
passing) that Giere puts Van Fraassen’s pragmatic methodological musings to the test.  Van Fraassen deflates 
Sellars’ (1962) inference to the best explanation contention that Smart (1963) defends as a “following a general rule 
of  inference” in support of  a rationality claim for realism.  But what, asks Van Fraassen rhetorically, does it mean 
to follow a general rule of inference?  It certainly cannot entail having to know all the valid argument-forms in first-
order logic (whether predicate or propositional).  (Many Ph.D.s in a particular scientific discipline wholly ignorant 
of the latter get along just fine in articulating their theories, let alone developing novel ones.)  Hence this notion is 
too narrowly conceived.  On the other hand, applying any rule of inference will not work either, as it would be too 
broadly conceived.  For instance, by the Rule of Addition one is free to infer “A or B or C or ….” ad infinitum from 
“A” alone.  (From “F = ma” the scientist can validly infer: “F = ma, or all squares are circles, or pigs fly in the 
midnight sun, or…”) Van  Fraassen  thus responds: The scientist follows a rule of inference based on what s/he is 
“willing or unwilling to do…Here is a rival hypothesis [to Smart and Sellars]: we are always willing to believe that 
the theory [which] best explains the evidence, is empirically adequate.” (1980, 1998; 1076, italics added).  A’ la 
Pascal’s Wager, Giere counters Van Fraassen’s latter claim by showing that a realist strategy (as opposed to 
empiricism-whether constructive or otherwise), along the line of non-Bayesian decision theory (NBDT), is “the 
safer bet,” and therefore the more “rational” approach, all things considered. (Giere, 1985, 92-96).  NBDT is 
employed by Giere, as it is certainly the most pragmatic—i.e., is devoid of Bayesian algorithms rife with their 
associated controversial application and interpretation in open-ended cases involving risk and ignorance.  For an 
indication of some of the controversies surrounding Bayesian confirmation , see Salmon (1990, 1998) and Glymour 
(1981, 1998).  
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xxii
 To name one instance: Paul Dirac, using Hilbert space methods, “quantized” the 1DSHO which formally 
speaking entails an embedding procedure: ( ) ( )
HS
xtxtxtx aa ∨,  where the latter denote state-vectors in the 
(continuous) position basis in Hilbert space, and the disjunction represents different “pictures,” i.e., Schroedinger 
versus Heisenberg. (Note that these cases aren’t exhaustive).  The former, of course, represent variables 
(parameterized with respect to t ) in 2D classical phase.  Moreover, the functions H , T, V become, through this 
embedding, operators (denoted by the tilde superscript) in Hilbert space: ( ) ( )xV
m
pHVTH ˆˆ
2
ˆ
ˆ
2
+=+= a  where: 
xip ∂−= ˆˆ h  in which the differential likewise becomes an operator.  The algebra of observables in the quantum-
mechanical cases is expands from the classical (Poisson) to the non-commutative Heisenberg algebra: [ ] Iipx ˆˆ,ˆ h=  
(where Iˆ  is the identity operator).  So the quantum-mechanical rendition of the 1DSHO, the realist would claim, 
likewise “agrees” (i.e., is similar in respects and degrees) to essential observables for oscillatory quantum 
phenomena.  “Actual” (i.e., constructive) empiricists (Van Fraassen) of course suspend all “agreement” talk herein 
by pointing out that such mathematical niceties at best give an empirically adequate characterization of 
microphysical phenomena.  For Van Fraassen, of course, the very essential interpretative difficulties surrounding 
quantum mechanics, e.g., the associated anomalies of non-locality, acausality, etc., lend support to his overall 
pragmatically-based metaphysical agnosticism here, or so he argues. 
xxiii
 Ultimately delimited of course by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (HUP): h21ˆˆ ≥∆∆ xp —though in 
quantum optics and electrodynamics there are ways to “cheat” or circumvent this seemingly absolute lower limit in 
products of dispersion for the canonical observables—by creating “squeezed” states of the (quantized) EM field 
which represent generalized coherent (minimal uncertainty) coherent states.  In these special cases, an extra degree 
of freedom is added (the “squeeze parameter”) by which arbitrarily increasing the dispersion along its axis, the HUP 
“disk” can be shrunk to arbitrarily small radius.  
xxiv
 Giere’s notion should not be conflated with D. Lewis’ (1986), as shall be explained in greater detail in the 
following section. 
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xxv
 As with most prima facie ‘simple’ and basic notions in the fundamental enterprises (analytic philosophy, logic, 
mathematics, etc.) characterizing them in all their associated subtleties in a perspicuous manner free from 
controversy can be an intellectually formidable task—assuming it is even possible to do so, in some instances.  The 
enterprise perhaps is akin to the quest for a proof meeting similar standards of perspicuity and rigor in the field of 
mathematics for such prima facie simple statements like Goldbach’s conjecture or Fermat’s Last Theorem. So 
likewise in the case of the above distinctions—especially with regards to the specification of a priori. (Baehr (2006), 
Casullo (2002)).  Nevertheless, as a starting point, one can adopt the platitude that a prioricity connotes how certain 
propositions are known (Baehr (2006), 1): Aside from the necessary experiential basis of learning the language Λ 
constituting the expression of a proposition p in the form of a sentence(s) or wff(s) σp ∈ Λ, if no further experience is 
required to cogitate or understand what  σp expresses, one may claim that p is known a priori.  (If more experience 
is required, then p is known a posteriori.)  Aside from these fundamental epistemic modes (essentially involving the 
activity of justification), the distinction can also be applied to expressed propositions per se: Statements expressing 
propositions in pure mathematics (‘7+5 =12’) or pure logic (‘If all A are B, and all B are C, then all A are C’) are a 
priori while statements expressing factual claims about the actual world (‘Water is H2O’) are a posteriori.  More 
complex instances incorporating the distinction include attributing it to arguments: In an a priori argument, all its 
premises express a priori propositions. (Baehr, 2006, 2).  Much of the controversy surrounding how to best 
intrinsically characterize this prima facie epistemic notion on epistemic grounds (Casullo, 2002) centers on attempts 
to positively characterize what is meant by ‘experience’ (Baehr).     
Platitudes for the metaphysical distinction of necessity versus contingency hinge on the notion of truth in all versus 
some possible worlds, respectively.  Ab initio, one can consider the notion of a world as representing a maximally 
metaphysical possibility. (Winstanley (2007), 22)  By the same token, the semantic analytic/synthetic distinction is 
characterized in terms of the meaning-contents of the constituent subject and predicate terms in any sentence S 
expressing a proposition p.  Analytic sentences have predicate terms expressing the same meaning-contents as their 
associated subject terms, while synthetic statements do not exhibit this feature (the meaning contents can overlap, 
but they are not mutually contained in one another).  Regarding semantic notion of truth-conditions “the truth of a 
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synthetic proposition depends not on mere linguistic convention, but [also] on how the world is in some respect.” 
(Baehr, 2006, 3) 
Obviously, in all three notions mentioned above, resonant connotations suggest themselves (e.g., the truth conditions 
of synthetic statements reflecting a posteriori notions, etc.)  Indeed, some have argued that the relations among such 
distinctions entail logical reduction (the logical empiricist’s claims of aprioricity and analyticity, etc.)  Such points 
(relevant to Chalmers’ modal rationalism) shall be discussed in greater detail above.   
xxvi
 Depending on kind of logic, V can vary in cardinality from 2, i.e., V = { T , ⊥} in the typical binary logical case to 
ℵ1, i.e., V = [0, 1] = {v| 0 ≤ v ≤ 1} in the fuzzy logic case. 
xxvii
 Regarding the technical notation: The subscript fb∨R  represents a disjunct union, not a Boolean disjunction.  (I.e., 
in this case, its associated Boolean connective would be ∨ or exclusive-or).  Moreover note that the algebraic 
convention (of reading from right to left) is implemented in the function-composition notation : (g°f)(x) = f(g(x)). 
xxviii
 Kripke also (1980) by way of his ‘meter-stick’ example, in a dual fashion argues that a priori contingent 
statements can exist as well.  Introducing term ‘meter’ via its ‘baptism’ of rigidly designating its singular intension 
by virtue of the standard length of a rod  S kept in a vault in Paris for Kripke renders this identification a priori: “[I]f 
he used stick S to fix the reference of the term ‘one meter’, then as a result of this kind of ‘definition’…he knows 
automatically, without further investigation, that S is one meter long.” (56)  Nevertheless, metaphysically this is a 
contingent statement, since rigidly designating ‘meter’ by virtue of this standard length could have well yielded 
other measures, based on momentary compressions, heating, cooling, etc.  However, because this existence claim of 
Kripke’s has produced more controversy (Nimtz, Wintsanley) only the former  a posteriori necessary example is 
discussed above.   
xxix
 In that regard recall again how unique and subtle Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism really is: He assents in 
an acceptance of a literalist interpretation of theoretical unobservables, where most other anti-realists (whether 
empiricists, positivists, phenomenalists, etc., a’ la “liberal theologians,” recall n. xii. above ) would ascribe to a 
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‘metaphorical’ interpretation thereof.  Recall also some of the unique methodological claims Van Fraassen makes 
concerning the pragmatics of rule-following, explanation, etc., in the service of the value of ‘empirical adequacy.’  
xxx
 Recall Kripke’s contention that rigidly designated natural kind terms determine their own intension.  Water is 
H2O, no matter what we might conceive or imagine it to be. 
xxxi
 To name one innocuous instance based on Nimtz’s introductory examples.  To say: ‘I am in New York’ depends 
upon certain facts upon the world, i.e. the intension of ‘I am in New York.’  But it also depends upon intention and 
intentionality (the speaker’s mind-to-world relationship mediated by propositional attitudes and representations): ‘I 
am in New York’ clearly varies in meaning depending on who utters it.  To pick another example (Chalmers).  To 
say ‘I am not David Chalmers’ might either represent an innocuous a posteriori truism, or a flat-out a priori 
contradiction, again depending on who utters it—ceteris paribus concerning the totality of  metaphysical facts about 
the world. 
xxxii
 Salmon (1982) in particular complains that Kripke’s semantic essentialist points vis-à-vis his metaphysical 
conclusions are akin to “pulling a metaphysical rabbit out of a semantic hat.” (Winstanley (2007), 18).  Winstanley 
likewise accuses Chalmers of a similar sleight-of-hand, to which I respond above that Chalmers’ modal rationalism 
remains largely immune to such accusations. 
xxxiii
 Equality holding in the particular case when one (for whatever reason) wishes to restrict the metaphysically 
possible worlds to centered ones with the same ‘graininess’ of individuation as the worlds conceived-as-actual. 
xxxiv
 Referred to the evening star as ‘Phosphorus’, etc. 
xxxv
 Prima facie this may appear as strenuously obvious, almost reflexive.  However (recall n. xxv above) 
controversy abounds.  Aside from logical empiricists arguing that the a priori and a posteriori distinction reduces to 
the semantic distinction of analyticity and syntheticity, more generally analysis of the a priori subdivides into the 
reductive (of which the aforementioned is an instance) versus non-reductive. (Casullo (2002), 98-99).  The latter 
category gets further subdivided into non-reductive epistemic, which in particular focuses on justification, versus the 
non-reductive non-epistemic (which may focus non –reductively of an analysis of the a priori qua necessity, etc.)  
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The former gets cashed out into sub-sub-categories focusing on source, the strength, and the defeasibility of the 
justification.  Casullo is critical toward all non-epistemic analyses, whether reductive or otherwise, and offers his 
own positive characterization of non-empirical sources of justification.  The details of his argument lie beyond the 
scope of this essay. 
xxxvi
 Chalmers makes this non-reductively epistemic point explicitly clear in several places throughout his essay.  In 
particular, in answering an objection that ideal conceivability could either rule out (a’ la Kripke) any talk of a 
substantial connection between (epistemic) conceivability and (metaphysical) possibility, or trivialize the connection 
by reducing one to the other, Chalmers steers between this Scylla and Charibdes in his response that he is not out to 
reduce one to the other.  Moreover, “the notion of possibility enters into the definition of conceivability in such a 
roundabout way the thesis [of a connection but not a conflation] clearly remains substantive.” (173) 
xxxvii
 Certainly, in that regard, the “extreme empiricist” (Giere’s Case 1, p. 10  above) wields such a club. Another 
issue paralleling the methodological disjunction of applying a priori versus a posteriori methods  as a result of 
Hume’s legacy in the philosophy of science has to do with what to make of deductive versus inductive reasoning.  
Pace Hume’s points concerning the inductive fallacy, it certainly does not follow that the project of developing an 
‘inductive logic’ is doomed from the start.  It may just be much more difficult to achieve: Witness, in particular, the 
wrangling between those sympathetic to Bayesianism (Salmon (1990, 1998)) versus those that are not (Glymour 
(1981, 1998)).  Of course, Bayesians do not corner the market on attempts to devise inductive logics (ILs) (one can 
be anti-Bayesian and still ascribe to the general project of developing ILs), only that this research tradition appears 
to be the most prominent in that regard.  
xxxviii
 Of course, all those working in this empirically-motivated research into the phenomenology as well as into the 
cognitive process which may constitute such complex activity may not necessarily ascribe to anything that can be 
simply abstracted in terms of Chalmers’ suggested schema in (MR-1).  However, if nothing else (albeit somewhat 
weakly stated) it is plausible to argue that whatever is (literally) going in the minds of scientists in this regard does 
not at least involve elements of (i.), (ii.), (iii.) in MR-1 (i.e., the epistemic, modal, and metaphysical notions of 
‘claims’) though perhaps not in any particular order, let alone that suggested by Chalmers.   
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xxxix
 Yablo (2002) however suggests that Chalmers’ modal rationalism may fall prey to the same problem bedeviling 
the logical empiricist—undeterdetermination of theory by evidence (Chalmers (2002), 184).  Though Chalmers does 
not openly avow any version of scientific realism, he resists this association with this version of anti-realism on 
methodological, epistemic, and metaphysical grounds: 
Underdetermination of theory by local evidence is no problem for a sufficiently holistic logical empiricist, 
but underdetermination of theory by total evidence is a problem…These [Yablo’s] considerations are all 
tied to the limitations of observation, however…They do nothing at all to suggest that the complete 
qualitative truth (including microphysical truths) underdetermines theory.  (ibid.) 
In any case, Van Fraassen (as discussed in §2.1 above) is no logical empiricist—he is a self-professed constructive 
empiricist.  In this regard, it is difficult to think that the specter of undeterdetermination would haunt Van Fraassen 
vis-à-vis Chalmers’s modal rationalism.  Van Fraassen, as discussed, is likewise comfortable with totalizing claims 
(recall his notion of empirical adequacy is defined via a model M of all phenomena, i.e. n. xi.above) as is Chalmers, 
with his notions of ‘complete qualitative truth.’  
xl
 Recall the notions of diagonal intension, as discussed in §3.2 above.  The identity-statement SV: ‘h = p’ (“Hesperus 
is Phosphorus”) has a necessary ‘horizontal’ or secondary intension modulo holding fixed the actual world wa.  In 
other words, modulo this world considered-as-actual, SV is true in the actual case (wa) but SV is true in the 
counterfactual (Hesperus refers to Mars) w’ case—recalling Kripke’s essentialism.  On the other hand, switching to 
w’ considered as actual (i.e., that Hesperus really is Mars) then SV is false in the ‘counterfactual’ case (that 
Hesperus is Phosphorous) as well as in the ‘actual’ case (since, again, ‘Hesperus’ rigidly designates Venus—but in 
w’ considered as actual Hesperus is not Venus, period).  As the table shows below, its diagonal intension is 
contingent.  On the other hand, repeating the same exercise for SM: ‘7+5=12’ (ignoring, pace Stalnaker, issues 
concerning about what base one has to working in—easily done if one interprets SM in terms of abstract cardinals; 
i.e. 7-ness added to 5-ness equals 12-ness) indicates a necessary diagonal intension. 
w’ F F 
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wa T T 
 wa w’ 
     Table 3.3.2-2D analysis for SV 
xli
 One particular example Winstanley discusses from Stalnaker can be met with a simple response (which I allude to 
in n. xl above).  Stalnaker’s concern for statements deemed a priori from mathematics like “7+5=12” can (according 
to Stalnaker’s meta-semantic conception of reinterpretation along the ‘vertical’ axis) exhibit diagonal contingencies, 
since the statement is obviously false in a world-considered-as-actual like w12 (i.e., a base-12 world).  But this 
concern can be easily brushed aside, should one distinguish between numbers (i.e., cardinals) and numerals (i.e., 
their representations).  Having said that, however, Stalnaker’s second example from mathematics is more 
substantial: Certainly statements one would  prima facie deem as a priori from geometry (the sum of the internal 
angles of a triangle = pi radians) are false in non-Euclidean reinterpretations.  In the other direction, Winstanley 
draws on Davies’ notion of ‘deeply rigid’ designators (based on Davies’ notion that the meanings of proper names 
are “completely exhausted” by their extensions) which (pace other 2DS approaches) would yield a necessary 
diagonal intension for identity statements like ‘h = p’. (Winstanley, (2007), 25)  Well and good.  However, one may 
still object to Winstanley here concerning whether or not the cases he discusses really constitute bona fide 
counterexamples to Chalmers, simply because of their theory (read: interpretation) dependence.  Get rid of 
Stalnaker’s and Davies’ interpretation of 2DS and these counterexamples go as well.  
xlii
 Prima facie versus ideal, primary versus secondary, positive versus negative = 23 = 8 cases of conceivability.  
With no loss of generality, however, positive versus negative can be ruled out, in possibility-talk, for in the negative 
case this just reduces to talk of ~S being possible, whether conceived as actual or as counterfactual.  But this is 
equivalent to talking about ‘positive’ possibility in the case of ~S.  Granted, however, metaphysical talk of negation, 
when examining particular topics like causation, can result in a huge morass.  (Schaffer (2003)).  To name one 
instance: Are non-events or negative facts bona fide causal relata?  (One speaks of  instances like: “Ben ducked, 
which caused the boulder not to hit him.”)  Since Chalmers never engages in a general discussion concerning the 
logic and metaphysics of negation, neither will I, in this essay.  Moreover, prima facie versus ideal likewise do not 
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apply in the case of possibility based on the interpretation of  worlds as potentially complete (and therefore 
consistent and coherent) hypothetical scenarios (whether conceived-as-actual or counterfactually).  Hence should 
one discover upon closer examination some latent contradiction buried deeply in her physical theory, for example, 
this conception is then automatically ruled out as a metaphysical possibility.    
However, a philosopher of science may object to this, for as Frisch (2005) shows, many successful and reliable 
theories like electromagnetism (EM) indeed are inconsistent.  When interpreted axiomatically, Maxwell’s 
Equations, the Lorentz force law, and energy conservation form an inconsistent set, in the case of modeling discrete 
charges.  Hence, though cognitively the class of models in such an instance is open-ended (the physicist happily 
models away the dynamics of discrete distributions of charges, producing all sorts of fruitful and reliable results) but 
logically, its class of models is empty.  To which someone sympathetic to modal rationalism may respond: “Yes, 
exactly my point.  The class is empty, these scenarios are logically and therefore metaphysically impossible.”  The 
fact that such instances of theory-articulation is obviously still reliable (it would be hard at present-day to even 
imagine our world, practically speaking, without the discoveries and contributions of Faraday, Lorentz, Maxwell, 
etc.) plays right into the hands of Van Fraassen—the aim of theories is empirical adequacy.  On the other hand, a 
constructive realist like Giere sympathetic to modal rationalism may simply bite the bullet and argue that the class of 
these cognitive models which obviously demonstrate such empirical success and reliability does not entail that they 
are metaphysically true (let alone being even logically consistent).  Indeed, they are not (strictly speaking). Point 
charges are also a nomological impossibility, as are perfectly rigid rods, etc.   
Whether one therefore considers these models as representing ‘fallible veracities’ (Teller (2004)) or ‘convenient 
fictions’ is in the eye of the beholder—gazing upon other issues such as property-realism, nomological skepticism 
(Cartwright (1999)) and other issues lying outside the scope of this essay.  In the main, however, details aside, the 
issues hinge upon how to tell an ‘appropriate’ idealization.  Plato already reminded us that representation is not 
duplication, hence the former is always ‘false’ in some sense.  Logical consistency, in that regard, though an 
essential desideratum in many instances, may not ultimately prove itself to be an absolutely necessary condition in 
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certain contexts—hence Van Fraaseen’s claim of empirical adequacy over truth.  To which the realist rejoins-
reliability in terms of ‘saving the phenomena’ is neither necessary nor sufficient for truth. 
xliii
 As disciplinary specialties within the field of physics, mathematical physics and theoretical physics should not be 
equivocated.  They are distinct disciplines, though obviously not disjunct. 
xliv
 Recall the metaphysical/epistemic impasse of Kant’s antinomies.  Not only is the modal gate between epistemic 
conceivability and metaphysical possibility not excessively wide, but (for Kant) there may be more than one gate 
that cognition must negotiate!  “[T]he…will is…in its visible acts, necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far 
not free, while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself,…not subject to that law, and…therefore free.” (Kant, 
(1781,1965), 28). To invoke my illustration: Modal gate 1 (nomological necessity): “Nope, sorry no free will here.  
Go to gate 2, maybe they can help you.”  Modal gate 2 (metaphysical possibility): “Sure, the will is free—but you 
don’t get to know!  Go back to gate 1.”    
xlv
 The choice of connectives here is rather deliberate.  The “⊃” is the material conditional: For any wffs ϕ, ψ: ϕ⊃ψ 
is a priori iff  (ϕ→ψ) is true.  (Chalmers (2002), 175) 
xlvi
 Consider as an example Railton’s (1981) notion of an “ideal explanatory text.” 
